On 9 September 2026, the Supreme Administrative Court of Lithuania (LVAT) delivered its judgment in Case no. SU-32-575/2026 concerning the distinction between restrictions of freedom of movement and detention of asylum applicants during border procedures.
The case concerned a pregnant applicant for international protection whom the Migration Department required to stay in a reception centre without freedom of movement during the border procedure. She challenged that decision and requested accommodation in a temporary accommodation facility without restrictions of movement. She could move within territory of the reception centre but could not leave without prior permission or escort. She requested permission to leave on three occasions but was not able to do so.
The Court first clarified that, although Article 54(1) Regulation (EU) 2024/1348 (the Asylum Procedure Regulation) requires applicants undergoing the border procedure to reside at a designated location, the arrangements implementing that obligation must comply with Directive (EU) 2024/1346 (the recast Reception Conditions Directive). Accordingly, national law must be interpreted in light of that Directive and, in the event of a conflict, EU law prevails and conflicting national provisions must be disapplied. The Court emphasised that detention requires specific grounds, an individual assessment of its necessity and a reasoned decision, and that immediate release is required where detention is unlawful.
It further held that the prohibition on entering the territory of a Member State during the border procedure under Article 43(2) of the Asylum Procedure Regulation does not, in itself, constitute a sufficient legal basis for deprivation of liberty. Detention is an autonomous concept of EU law, and its distinction from restrictions on freedom of movement depends on the measure’s actual content and effects. This requires an overall assessment of the applicant’s individual circumstances, the purpose and duration of the regime, procedural guarantees and the nature and extent of the restrictions, including whether the person has a real possibility of voluntarily leaving the accommodation facility.
In the present case, the Court found that the restrictions amounted to detention. Under national law, detention exceeding 48 hours requires a court decision, so the Migration Department’s decision did not provide a sufficient legal basis. It also failed to identify any of the grounds for detention under Article 10(4) of the recast Reception Conditions Directive, to individually assess the necessity of detention or to explain why less restrictive measures could not be applied. The Court noted that pregnancy does not itself preclude border procedures or restrictions on movement, but must be considered when assessing proportionality and possible special reception needs.
The Court therefore concluded that the detention was unlawful, annulled the first-instance judgment and the Migration Department’s decision and ordered the applicant’s immediate release. It also required the Migration Department to reconsider her accommodation while allowing her to remain at the reception centre without restrictions on her freedom of movement in the meantime. The Court clarified that release did not itself authorise entry into Lithuanian territory or terminate the border procedure. While an obligation to reside at a designated place could remain if the procedure lawfully continued, this would not justify preventing the applicant from leaving the accommodation facility.